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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS,
Cross-petitioner,

:
:

v.

:

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Cross-respondent.

Case No. 900471
Priority No. 13

:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the prosecutor violate the plea agreement, entitling
Mr. Pharris to withdrawal of the plea?
2. Did the trial court violate standards of judicial
neutrality in reimposing the withdrawn guilty plea on the day of
trial?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Pharris' withdrawal of the reimposed plea?
4. Did the trial court rely on material misinformation in
sentencing Mr. Pharris?
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals7 decision, State v. Pharris, 143 Utah
Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is included in Appendix 1 to this
brief.
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals' opinion was filed on September 14,
1990.

No petition for rehearing was filed.

The State's petition

for certiorari was filed on October 15, 1990. This Court's
jurisdiction is provided by Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Pharris entered a plea of guilty to retail theft, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-602(1), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge,
presiding (T. 5). After sentencing, the trial court allowed
Mr. Pharris to withdraw the plea, but then reimposed the plea on the
day of trial (T. 11-12).

Defense counsel moved to withdraw the

reimposed plea, and the trial court denied the motion and reimposed
the sentence (T. 20).
While the original plea agreement bound the prosecutor from
opposing Mr. Pharris' motion for a lesser sentence (T. 2), the
prosecutor twice summarized Mr. Pharris' criminal record, which was
already before the court in the pleadings file (T. 7-8, 17; R. 9-14).
Although there was no evidence that the offense alleged was
drug related, the trial court's comments during the sentencing
hearing indicate that the trial court thought the offense was drug
related.
Mr. Pharris appealed the conviction and sentence to the
Utah Court of Appeals, raising several issues. The Court of Appeals
reversed Mr. Pharris' conviction, reaching only the issue relating
to the trial court's failure to comply with Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11 in accepting Mr. Pharris' guilty plea.

Pharris at 35.

Noting that during the entry of the guilty plea, the trial court had

- 2 -

failed to review on the record three of the Rule 11 requirements
(waiver of right against self-incrimination, understanding of nature
and elements of offense, knowledge of potential punishment), the
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for withdrawal
of the plea.

Id. at 37-38.

The State petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari,
attacking the Court of Appeals' analysis of the issue reached by the
court.
Mr. Pharris opposes the State's petition for a writ of
certiorari, and presents this conditional cross-petition solely to
preserve the issues not reached by the Court of Appeals, which will
be pertinent to his appeal in the event that this Court grants the
State's petition for a writ.1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relating to Mr. Pharris' conviction are
adequately presented in the Court of Appeals' decision.

143 Utah

Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
REASONS FOR GRANTING MR. PHARRIS' CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITION
Mr. Pharris does not contend that the issues raised in this
conditional cross-petition fall within any of the circumstances
justifying a writ listed in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 46.

1

It is not clear that this conditional cross-petition is
necessary to preserve Mr. Pharris' issues raised in but not reached
by the Court of Appeals. See Stern, Gressman, and Shapiro, Supreme
Court Practice (6th Edition) at 382-387 (under United States Supreme
Court practice, the law is ambiguous as to when a cross-petition for
certiorari is necessary); State v. Brvan. 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah
1985)(this Court may affirm the ruling of the lower court on any
proper ground).
- 3 -

Mr. Pharris invokes this Court's broad common law powers to
issue the writ,2 so that Mr. Pharris' entire case is preserved for
consideration in the event this Court grants the State's petition
for a writ.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Pharris requests that this Court grant his conditional
cross-petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
in the event that this Court grants the State's petition for a
writ.
Respectfully submitted this 3&tL day of October, 1990.

JAMEfS A. VALDEZ
Attorney for Mr. Pharris

. Pharris

2

This Court's common law powers to issue the writ are
recognized in Article VIII section 3 of the Utah Constitution, and
explained in Boaaess v. Morris. 635 P.2d 39, 42-43 (Utah 1981).

- 4 -
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APPENDIX 1
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION

i<o uian Adv. Kep. 35
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JTATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
rank Edward PHARRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jo. 890549-CA
ILED: September 14, 1990
hird District, Salt Lake County
he Honorable Richard H. Moffat
TTORNEYS:
imes A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
sfore Judges Billings, Jackson, and Newey.1
[LLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Frank Edward Pharris appeals
s conviction of retail theft, a third degree
lony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76502(1) (1989). We vacate the conviction
d remand.
Defendant was accused of taking a VCR
>m a Sears store without paying for it.
•lice arrested defendant in the store parking
with the VCR in his possession.
Defendant's trial was set for August 8,
S9. On the day of trial, defendant agreed to
er a guilty plea if the State would not
pose a motion that defendant be sentenced
rsuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6i(l)(c) (1989), for a class A misdemeanor.
Kt the change of plea hearing, the trial
ge asked defendant whether he had gone
T his statement with his attorney, whether
was under the influence of drugs or
3hol, whether he understood the English
guage, whether he was threatened or proed anything other than the plea bargain
If, and whether he was acting freely and of
own volition.
'he judge then told defendant he was entito certain constitutional protections inclig the right to trial by a jury, the right to
front and cross-examine witnesses, the
t to require the State to prove its case
Dnd a reasonable doubt, and "other valuconstitutional rights." Defendant said he
erstood his waiver of those rights by pleg guilty and was willing to do so.
lie judge asked defendant if he had any
.tions of the court or of his attorney.
mdant responded, "No." The judge asked
fendant knew the allrvwaKip npnoitior f~- ~

ndant answered, "Yes." The judge told defendant the court was not bound by the recommendations of the plea bargain and the
court could impose any sentence either concurrently or consecutively with the sentence
defendant was presently serving.
Defendant entered a plea of guilty which the
judge declared was entered voluntarily and
knowingly. Defendant waived the two-day
minimum time for sentencing and asked to be
sentenced immediately. Defense counsel asked
the court to impose sentence as a class A
misdemeanor. The prosecutor did not oppose
defense counsel's request but described defendant's extensive criminal record. The judge
denied defendant's motion to reduce the
offense one degree and sentenced defendant to
serve zero to five years concurrently with the
sentence he was presently serving.
Defendant immediately moved to withdraw
his guilty plea and asked to proceed to trial.
Defense counsel , argued that unless his client
received some concession in the sentence, it
would be a disservice to him not to go to trial.
The judge granted the motion and set trial for
the next day.
The next morning, the judge reversed his
decision granting the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea, explaining that a showing of
"good cause" was required. The judge then
gave defendant an opportunity to show good
cause as to why his plea should be withdrawn.
In response, defense counsel explained the
State had not opposed the reduction of defendant's sentence to a class A misdemeanor.
He pointed to the length of time defendant
had been incarcerated since his arrest and the
circumstances surrounding defendant's release
on another conviction and his subsequent
arrest. Defense counsel also mentioned that he
had ineffectively represented defendant by
indicating that the plea baigain had a good
chance of success. In response, the prosecutor
again outlined portions of defendant's prior
criminal record.
The judge noted he had informed defendant
before the guilty plea was entered that the
recommendations as to the sentence were not
binding on the court and defendant's disappointment with the sentence did not establish
good cause for withdrawal of the plea. The
judge ultimately reimposed the sentence.
Among other claims on appeal,2 defendant
asserts the trial judge failed to comply with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as required by the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987), when accepting his guilty plea. Defendant contends the trial court failed to inform
him of (1) his right a g a i n s t selfincrimination; (2) the nature and elements of
the offense: and n^ th*> nncci'hi** r^«oi*;~«

does not contend the trial court's questioning
of defendant complies with the Gibbons strict
compliance test, but rather responds that
appellate court decisions subsequent to Gibbons
have abandoned the strict compliance
standard and allow application of the prior
"record as a whole" test to determine whether
defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered
his guilty plea. The State further asserts that,
at the hearing before the trial judge, defendant
did not articulate as a ground for withdrawal
of his plea that the court failed to comply with
Rule 11 and thus defendant cannot raise this
issue for the first time on appeal.
CONSIDERING VOLUNTARINESS OF
GUILTY PLEA FOR FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
Court of Appeals have allowed a Rule 11
challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be
considered for the first time on appeal. "[I]n
certain cases we may consider the failure to
comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be
first raised on appeal to this court." State v.
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (per curiam).3 See also State v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (defendant
had not moved to withdraw guilty plea and
court remanded to the trial court to allow a
withdrawal motion while retaining jurisdiction
over the case).
The Valencia court relied on the United
States Supreme Court decision in Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), where the
Court found no error when the Alabama
Supreme Court, on its own motion, dealt with
the constitutionality of a guilty plea. Id. at
240. The Court stated that "[i]t was error,
plain on the face of the record, for the trial
judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent
and voluntary. Id. at 242.4
"'Although we acknowledge that the trial
judge made a greater effort to ensure that
defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly given than in Valencia and Boykin;
because of the fundamental rights involved,
we conclude the trial court's deficiencies in
determining whether the guilty plea was
entered knowingly and voluntarily constitute
plain error.5 We therefore will address this
issue for the first time on appeal.
RULE 11
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure sets out findings a court must make
before accepting a guilty plea. Rule 11(5)
provides, in pertinent part:
The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty or no contest, and
— -•

—+

•!•»/*

*>loo

until

the

(0) t n e p i e a IS V U l U i u a i a ; uiHuv,

(c) the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial, and to
confront and cross-examine in
open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea
he waives all of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense
to which he is entering the plea;
that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the
minimum and maximum sentence
that may be imposed upon him for
each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences;
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).
Prior to 1987, the Utah Supreme Court did
not require strict compliance with Rule 11.
The court had concluded that a guilty plea
may be upheld if "the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that defendant entered
his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences." Warner v. Morris,
709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985) (mem.); see also
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). This "record as a
whole" test was later reaffirmed in State v.
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam).
In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court rejected
the "record as a whole" test. In State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court announced that strict compliance was required under Rule 11(5) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when defendants entered guilty pleas. Id. at 1314. In Gibbons, the trial judge, in accepting
Gibbons' guilty plea, informed him of the
penalties for the crimes, the constitutional
rights he waived as articulated in Rule 11, the
possible sentences for the crimes, and the
possibility that those sentences could run
concurrently or consecutively. Id. at 1311.
However, the trial judge failed to inform
Gibbons of the elements of the crimes. Id. The
Utah Supreme Court remanded Gibbon's
appeal of his guilty plea because he had not
filed a motion to withdraw his plea, thereby
depriving the trial court of the opportunity to
address the error, but articulated its concern
that the plea was not properly taken as defendant had not been adequately informed of
the elements of the offense to which he pled. Id.

w accepting guilty pleas. The court noted the
"ial court's burden to comply with the Rule
1 requirements:
Because of the importance of
compliance with Rule 11(e) [new
Rule 11(5)] and Boykin, the law
places the burden of establishing
compliance with those requirements
on the trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make sure that their clients
fully understand the contents of the
affidavit.
The use of a sufficient affidavit
can promote efficiency, but- an
affidavit should be only a starting
point, not an end point, in the
pleading process,
at 1313.
"he court found that a "sufficient affidavit *
uld contain the following elements: (1) a
of the names and the degrees of the crimes
rged; (2) a statement of the elements of the
mses; (3) a synopsis of the defendant's acts
establish the elements of the crimes
rged; (4) the allowable punishment for the
les charged and note the possibility of
secutive sentences for multiple crimes; (5)
rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea;
he details of any plea bargain with a disner that any sentencing recommendations
not be followed; (7) the defendant's
ty to read and understand the English
iiage; (8) the defendant's competency; and
he absence of any inducements to infludefendant's plea. Id. at 1313-14. The
I concluded that " [t]he trial judge should
review the statements in the affidavit with
iefendant, question the defendant concehis understanding of it, and fulfill the
requirements imposed by [Rule 11] on
'cord before accepting the guilty plea." Id.
4 (emphasis added).
* Gibbons standard was acknowledged by
ourt in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d
Itah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 765
1278 (Utah 1988), where we reiterated
le that:
]rial courts may not rely on
sfense counsel or executed affid/its to satisfy the specific requireents of Rule 11(e). [Gibbons, 740
.2d] at 1313. Rather, with or
ithout an affidavit or defense
>unsel's advice, the trial court
ust conduct an on-the-record
view with defendant of the Rule
(e) requirements.
opulos, 756 P.2d at 94 (quoting Gib740 P.2d at 1314)). However, in
opulos, the defendant's guilty plea was

„
«,~ jpxwi^ua ICUJJTU as a wnole" test.
Recently in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we clearly held
that the Gibbons strict compliance test is
controlling. Id. at 28.
Other opinions have likewise stated the test
for determining whether Rule 11 has been
followed is the strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons. See State v. Smith, 111 P.2d
464, 465 (Utah 1989)6; State v. Valencia, 776
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per
curiam)7.
The State relies on Jolivet v. Cook, 784
P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110
S. Ct. 751 (1990),* and State v. Copeland, 765
P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988),* to support its
argument that the Utah Supreme Court has
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test.
However, we assume that the court applied the
"record as a whole" test in these cases because
the guilty pleas in both cases were entered
before the Gibbons decision.10
The State also argues that this court has
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test as
well in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). However, Thurston is not on
point and the State is mistaken in its reliance
on this case. In Thurston, the defendant
argued the State had not kept its part of the
plea agreement as to the recommendation that
defendant receive probation and thus defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea because of this failure. Id. at 1301. The
issue was not whether the trial court failed to
comply with Rule 11 in determining whether
the plea was knowing and voluntary. As the
court explained:
The record here establishes that
defendant was fully informed of his
rights and the consequences of his
guilty plea.
The judge, pursuant to Rule 11,
informed defendant of his rights to
trial and a g a i n s t
selfincrimination, and related to him
the potential consequences of his
guilty plea.
Id. at 1302.
In summary, we find the Gibbons strict
compliance test is applicable to this postGibbons guilty plea. In reviewing the trial
court's inquiry into the voluntariness of defendant's plea, we find the trial judge did not
review with the defendant in court on the
record three of the requirements of Rule 11.
First, the trial court did not as required by
Rule ll(5)(c) inform defendant at the time the
plea was taken that he waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination by pleading guilty to the offense. The State argues
that this information is included in the affidavit. However, inclusion in the affidavit alone

Next, tne inai C U U l L lllClVlV AAV/ l i i u w . . , v
record concerning defendant's understanding
of the nature and elements of the offense as
required by Rule 1 l(5)(d). The State argues
that the nature and elements of the offense of
retail theft were explained at defendant's
preliminary hearing. However, the preliminary
hearing transcript is not before us and thus it
is impossible for us to make this determination. Again, this information is only in the
affidavit and, as we have explained, that alone
is insufficient. Failure to inform a defendant
of the nature and elements of the offense is
fatal to a guilty plea conviction. See Gibbons,
740 P.2d at 1314." See also Valencia, 776
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Finally, the trial court failed to review the
possible punishment with defendant as required by Rule ll(5)(e). The record reflects the
following dialogue between the defendant and
the trial court on the issue of penalties:
Q [THE COURT]: Are you aware of the
possible penalties that can be imposed for a
Third Degree Felony? Has your attorney told
you what the possible penalties are?
A [DEFENDANT]: Yes.
Utah courts have found the failure to
inform a defendant of the punishments possible is fatal to a guilty plea conviction. 12 See
Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (court
reversed because record did not show defendant was informed of the minimum mandatory sentence which would be imposed); Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 95 (in a pic-Gibbons
plea, the court reversed after finding the defendant did not understand the possibility of
consecutive sentences). 13
Under the Gibbons strict compliance test,
before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court
must review on the record with the defendant
at the time the plea is taken the nature and
elements of the offense, the constitutional
rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives
by pleading guilty, and the allowable penalties.
We find that the trial court failed to strictly
"comply with Rule 11 and Gibbons and thus we
vacate defendant's conviction and remand to
the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea.
Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Robert L. Newey, Judge
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (1990).
2. Defendant also claims that (1) the prosecutor
failed to comply with the plea agreement; (2) the
court erred in reversing its prior order granting
withdrawal of the plea; (3) there was "good cause"
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea; and
* .»_ —•«„„« WQC hased on material

3. In Valencia, the defendant was aaKcu i«y M«™
ions at the time the guilty plea was entered: (1)
whether defendant "understood his affidavit;" and
(2) whether his plea was "voluntary." Valencia, 776
P.2d at 1334. The court found that the guilty plea
was not entered in compliance with Rule 11(5) or
with Gibbons and summarily reversed and remanded
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and
proceed to trial. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1334.
4. In Boykin, there was no dialogue in the record
between the defendant and the trial judge as to the
voluntariness of the guilty plea, Boykin, 395 U.S. at
239, and the United States Supreme Court therefore
concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights
had been violated. Id. at 243.
5. The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated a twopart test for determining plain error. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110
5. Ct. 62 (1989). First, the error must be "plain,"
which means "from our examination of the record,
we must be able to say that it should have been
obvious to the trial court that it was committing
error." Id. at 35. Second, the error "must affect the
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error
be harmful." Id. See also State v. Braun, 787 P.2d
1336, 1341 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The defendant's guilty plea in this case was
entered after the Gibbons case was decided. Therefore, it should have been obvious to the trial judge
that strict compliance with Rule 11 was required. In
addition, defendant's substantial constitutional
rights were affected by this failure to strictly comply
with Rule 11.
6. In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court allowed the
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea because the trial
judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11. Smith,
111 P.2d at 465. The court ruled that the test for
complying with Rule 11 is the strict compliance test
articulated in Gibbons. Id. The court then found
that neither the plea bargain affidavit nor the trial
judge clearly communicated that defendant would
be required to serve a minimum mandatory sentence
of five years. Id.
7. In Valencia, the defendant entered his guilty plea
after the Gibbons decision. The trial judge failed to
review the contents of the affidavit with the defendant. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. The court concluded that the affidavit alone could not "serve as a
mere substitute for the full and complete review on
the record by the trial court that is required by the
rule." Id. Since the trial judge failed to comply with
Rule 11, the court remanded to the trial court to
allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Id.
8. In J olivet, the Utah Supreme Court applied the
"record as a whole" test to Jolivet's motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149.
While the court does not give the date Jolivet
entered his guilty plea or address the fact that the
guilty plea had been entered prior to Gibbons, the
Jolivet decision was the second appeal by the defendant, who had entered his guilty plea prior to the
first appeal decided in 1986, before the decision in
Gibbons. See State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah
1986).
9. In Copeland, the defendant argued that the trial
court failed to explain the nature and elements of
the offense. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273. The court
examined the record and found that the trial court
had adequately explained the elements of the crime
• « -J-— iA Aithrmoh the trial court did

ise the preferred method of having the
idant state in his own words his understanding
* offense and the actions which make him
of the crime," id., the court found that the
Us of the offense were clearly explained to
lant at the time of his arraignment and, therunder the "record as a whole" test, the plea
)luntary. Id. Once again, however, Copeland
i his guilty plea before Gibbons was decided
though the court did not articulate this as a
for applying the "record as a whole" test, we
\ this to be the case.
ah courts have refused to apply the Gibbons
:ompliance test to pre-Gibbons guilty pleas.
te v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.
1988), this court ruled that the Gibbons test
t apply since Vasilacopulos entered his guilty
1984 before the Gibbons case was decided. Id.
The court ruled that since the Gibbons
is a "clear break with the past," it would not
plied retroactively. Id. See also State v.
an, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah 1989) (per
).
le Gibbons court relied on McCarthy v.
States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), where the
States Supreme Court stated that the factual
ts of the charges must be explained so the
ant understands those elements. Id. at 466.
ourt concluded that "[t]here is no adequate
Jte for demonstrating in the record at the
\e plea is entered the defendant's understand s nature of the charge against him." Id.
e State argues the affidavit is sufficient to
' defendant of the allowable sentence,
er, the affidavit signed by the defendant
'Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5" under the notation
ime, Degree, and Punishment," but the affiid not include the term "years" following "0* Gibbons court stated that a judge may not
affidavit to establish compliance with Rule
is not sufficient to assume that
fense attorneys make sure that their
ents fully understand the contents of
e affidavit.
The use of a sufficient affidavit can
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PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on appellant's motion for summary reversal for manifest error, pursuant to Utah R. A p p . P . 10.
In response, appellee filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs motion for summary disposition,
but did not file a response addressing the
merits of appellant's motion.
We first consider appellee's motion to
dismiss appellant's motion. Appellee contends
that the motion was untimely based on Rule
10's requirement that a motion for summary
disposition be filed within 10 days after the
docketing statement is served. Appellant's
docketing statement was served on July 9,
1990, and her motion for summary disposition
was filed on July 23, 1990. Appellant contends
that because she served the docketing statement by mail, she was entitled to an additional
three days after service of the docketing statement in which to file a motion for summary
reversal. See Utah R. App. P. 22(d). Although
this three-day mailing rule is usually applied
when the receiving party is required or permitted to act after receipt of the document, it
does not specifically exclude the present situation. It is unnecessary to rely upon the
mailing rule, however, since Utah R. App. P .
2 provides this court with the flexibility to
suspend the requirements of Rule 10, on its
own motion, where asuspension is "[i]n the
interest of expediting a decision." Because we
conclude that the motion is clearly meritorious
and would thus support a suspension of Rule

